Alternative Dispute Resolution by Bedikian, Mary A.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2007
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Mary A. Bedikian
Michigan State University College of Law, bedik@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary A. Bedikian, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 53 Wayne L. Rev. 73 (2007).
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MARY A. BEDIKIANt
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION .........................................
II. ARBITRABILITY .........................................
A. The Severability Doctrine under Prima Paint .............
B. Procedural versus Substantive Arbitrability; Time-Limitation
B ar ............. ....... ...... ...................
C. Exhausting Conditions Precedent to Arbitration ...........
III. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE ..............
A. Forum Inaccessibility; Cost-Deterrent Analysis under Green
Tree .............................................
B. Invalid Arbitrator-Selection Clause; Severability of Offending
Provision .............
C. Common Law Arbitration .
IV. VACATUR OF ARBITRAL AWARI
A. Manifest Disregard of the L
B. Evident Partiality .......
V. DOMESTIC RELATIONS ARBITRA
VI. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS .....
A. RUAA Developments .....
B. The Fair Arbitration Act of
VII. CONCLUSION ............. ..... ............... .... ... 1 10
I. INTRODUCTION
The decisions during this Survey period' continued to promote
I Professor of Law in Residence and Director, ADR Program, Michigan State
University College of Law, B.A. 1971, Wayne State University; M.A. 1975, Wayne State
University; J.D. 1980, Michigan State University College of Law (formerly, Detroit College
of Law). The author gratefully acknowledges the technical library assistance of Barbara
Bean, J.D., M.S.L.S., the research assistance of Maria Toto (J.D., May 2007), the
contributions of Alan Kantor, Esq. who provided commentary to Buckeye, and the insightful
comments of Brian Pappas, Esq., ADR Fellow 2007-08, Michigan State University College
of Law.
1. The Survey period for this article covers Michigan Supreme Court and Michigan
Court of Appeals cases, in addition to United States Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit cases,
decided June 1,2005 through May 31, 2006. Also covered are statutes enacted or introduced
during this period.
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arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution. In the majority of cases,
the decisions were clear and well-analyzed, and resulted in either
solidifying precedent or clarifying the more esoteric areas of arbitral
jurisprudence. For example, in a near-unanimous decision, the United States
Supreme Court crystallized the distinction between claims of fraud that
relate to the contract as a whole, and those that reach or are directed to the
arbitration clause specifically. The Sixth Circuit, which published nine
2opinions, spun off an interesting and diverse array of jurisprudence. This
2. The Sixth Circuit also rendered a number of unpublished but important decisions in
the realm of labor arbitration primarily. See Armco Emp. Indep. Fed'n, Inc. v. AK Steel
Corp., 149 Fed. Appx. 347 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that arbitrator exceeded his authority by
failing to limit the employer's liability for monetary damages for improperly discontinuing
the transportation program for apprentices, only some of whom qualified for relief); Bixby
Med. Center, Inc. v. Michigan Nurses Ass'n, 142 Fed. Appx. 843 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that arbitrator's timeliness determination that was predicated on whether the nurses' union
and not just individual nurses had the independent right to assert a grievance under the
collective bargaining agreement was proper, given that the CBA terms with respect to the
prosecution of claims were ambiguous); Brokate v. Express Jet Airlines, Inc., 174 Fed.
Appx. 867 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that flight attendant's failure to seek arbitration on her
own behalf before the System Board of Adjustment was fatal to her claims); D.E.I., Inc. v.
Ohio and Vicinity Reg'l Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed. Appx. 164 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that arbitration award, where the panel found that an architectural firm, which the bank hired
as the construction manager for a bank project, violated a term of the collective bargaining
agreement prohibiting the firm from subcontracting with non-union contractors, fell within
the scope of the collective bargaining agreement); Gilreath v. Clemens & Co., 212 Fed.
Appx. 451 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that arbitrator's decision that employer did not breach
its contractual obligations through its alleged failure to offer employee overtime
opportunities and its alleged discharge of him in retaliation for "whistleblower" activity
drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement); Golden v. Commc'ns Workers
of America, AFL-CIO, 182 Fed. Appx. 459 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that union did not
breach its duty of fair representation in electing not to process grievance after three rounds
of representation, since collective bargaining agreement did not furnish a basis for an
arbitrator to rule in favor of employee on her demotion claim); Hartco Flooring Co. v.
United Paperworkers of America, Local 14597, 192 Fed. Appx. 387 (6th Cir.2006) (holding
that arbitrator whose decision with respect to whether the employer lacked requisite just
cause to terminate employee for violating safety policy was based on a plausible
construction of the collective bargaining agreement); Howell v. Rivergate Toyota, Inc., 144
Fed. Appx. 475, (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a provision in an arbitration agreement
embedded in an employment contract which vested in the employer the unilateral right to
amend the arbitration procedures was neither unreasonable nor unconscionable under
Tennessee law; by its terms, the unilateral amendment provision authorized only those
changes that were necessary or appropriate to give effect to intent of procedure in light of
changed circumstances, and employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing prohibited it from
amending procedure for an improper or oppressive purpose); Legair v. Circuit City, Inc., 213
Fed. Appx. 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (arbitration agreement between retailer and employee,
requiring binding arbitration of employer-employee disputes, was not procedurally
unconscionable, given that retailer made extensive effort to explain the terms of the
arbitration program and provided a 30-day window for consulting an attorney); Liberte
[Vol. 53:73
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Court decided cases which addressed substantive versus procedural
arbitrability, the impact of non-disclosure in arbitral proceedings under the
FAA, whether the cost-deterrent equation under Green Tree applies to state-
based claims, and the impact of offending provisions in an employer-
promulgated arbitration agreement. In other developments, the Michigan
Supreme Court reversed the 2005 decision of the Michigan Court of
Appeals, and held that the Domestic Relations Arbitration Act does not
require the formality of a hearing comparable to hearings in court. Finally,
the Michigan Court of Appeals, though less prolific than in prior years, re-
affirmed the presumption favoring arbitration. The court found that a
deficient statutory arbitration scheme is not cured by the default of a
common law agreement, and held that in cases where common law
principles and clear statutory language conflict, the statute controls.3
Capital Group, LLC v. Capwill, 148 Fed. Appx. 413 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that elderly
couple's arbitration claims against a financial investment firm whose agent sold them
viatical insurance investments were not encompassed by the class action against the
company so as to preclude arbitration under the National Association of Securities Dealers
{NASD} procedures); McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 164 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that invalid arbitrator-selection clause was severable from the remainder of the
agreement); Pennington v. Frisch's Rests., Inc., 147 Fed. Appx. 463 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that employees who asserted that they did not assent to arbitration because they did
not receive the terms of the employer's arbitration plan but who signed an arbitration
agreement indicating that they received and read the Employee Guide, which included the
terms of the arbitration plan, were required to arbitrate); Robert Bosch Corp. v. ASC Inc.,
195 Fed. Appx. (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a broad reservation of rights and remedies
clause in purchase order did not render arbitration clause in price quotations unenforceable
under Michigan's knock out rule, since "rights and remedies" did not cover the right to
judicial fora); Sterling Fluid Sys. (USA), Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
Union # 7, 144 Fed. Appx. 457 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that arbitrator's decision that
employer violated the subcontracting clause of the collective bargaining agreement when
it closed a foundry and shipped molds and dies to other facilities did not draw its essence
from the CBA, since the decision conflicted with the express terms of the CBA's
management rights clause, which authorized the employer to close the foundry and to
relocate molds and dies); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Century
Aluminum of Kentucky, 157 Fed. Appx. 869 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that Last Chance
Agreement, which stated that neither employee's termination nor any issue involving
termination would be subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, was susceptible to reasonable construction that excluded only
punishment, not whether violation of employer's rules occurred, thus the dispute as to
whether employee's conduct violated the employer's rule was arbitrable); and, Zucker v.
After Six, Inc., 174 Fed. Appx. 944 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that former sales representatives
wrongful termination suit was not subject to mandatory arbitration in employment contract
since the contract had expired two years prior to his termination and the dispute did not
involve facts that arose while the agreement was in effect).
3. The Michigan Court of Appeals also rendered a number of unpublished decisions.
Among the most noteworthy are Biram v. City of Detroit, No. 256131, 2006 WL 171508
2007]
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II. ARBITRABILITY
A. The Severability Doctrine under Prima Paint
In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,4 the United States
Supreme Court finally issued a clear and concise statement regarding who
determines the question of the validity of a contract, whether under federal
or state law, where the contract contains an arbitration clause. In 1967, the
United States Supreme Court established a doctrine which permitted courts
to address and decide challenges to the formation of various contracts and
clauses independent of other provisions in the agreement, such as an
arbitration clause itself.5 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that since the
plaintiff in the case under review only objected to the arbitration clause and
not the entire contract in which the clause was contained, there was no
requirement that the arbitration clause issues be referred to the arbitrator or
arbitration panel for determination.6 However, it was not until 1995 that the
Supreme Court confronted and answered the question about who decides
arbitrability questions in the absence of a clear and unmistakable finding
that the parties agreed to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration.'
In First Options, the United States Supreme Court explained that the law
treats silence or ambiguity regarding a question concerning appropriate
party differently from questions regarding whether a particular dispute is
within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement. As to the latter question,
First Options held that where a valid arbitration agreement exists, any
doubts about what will be included in it will be resolved in favor of
(Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2006) (holding that where the parties agree that any challenge to
an arbitrator's decision would be resolved according to the "Civil Service Commission
Rules" and state law, the arbitration decision is not a self-enforcing final decision. The case
was remanded for a factual determination whether the commission followed its own rules
in overturning the arbitrator's decision without any written factual findings); Castle Mgmt.
v. August, No. 253822, 2005 WL 217449 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2005) (holding that
affirmative defenses may be asserted in response to a motion for award confirmation); Davis
v. Meade Group, Inc., No. 262189,2006 WL 51872 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2006) (holding
that a separate dispute resolution policy, imposed on employees as a condition of
employment, is not undercut by later language disclaiming the agreement as an employment
contract); and, Socianu v. Socianu, No. 256590, 2006 WL 141717 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19,
2006) (holding that a court order referring a marital property distribution issue to arbitration
is not tantamount to a written arbitration agreement as required by the Domestic Relations
Arbitration Act).
4. 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
5. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
6.Id. at 406.
7. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
8. Id. at 944-45.
[Vol. 53:73
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arbitration.9 With respect to the question focusing on who should decide
questions of arbitrability, however, the Supreme Court reversed the pre-
existing presumption and held that unless the parties, by the terms of their
arbitration agreement, explicitly vest authority in the arbitrator to determine
issues of arbitrability, it ispresumedthat the parties intended that the courts
decide the issue.'0
The issue of deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable was previously
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.," which held that if the arbitration
agreement comes within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a
court must apply federal substantive law to determine the question of
arbitrability. 12 However, the remaining major roadblock to a clear
understanding of when the FAA would apply to the arbitrability
determination was not resolved until the Supreme Court's ruling in Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson."' In Allied-Bruce, the United States
Supreme Court clarified that the FAA applies to all written arbitration
provisions contained in a contract involving any transaction in which
interstate commerce is involved. 4 Pre-emption of state law arbitration by
the Federal Arbitration Act had first appeared in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. ofAmerica, " in which the United States Supreme Court was invited to
consider whether, in light of Erie, a federal court should apply the Federal
Arbitration Act in a diversity case when faced with state law hostile to
arbitration.' 6 The Court did not reach the question because it found that the
contract did not involve interstate commerce. 17 However, in Allied-Bruce,
the United States Supreme Court enforced an arbitration provision in a
residential termite-treatment contract between a pest control company and
an Alabama homeowner, effectively overruling an Alabama statute which
would have voided the arbitration clause. 18 In order to reach that result, the
Supreme Court found the necessary interstate commerce connection by
virtue of the fact that many chemicals used by the pest control company in
the treatment of termites had been shipped from an out-of-state location to
9.Id.
l0.Id.
11. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
12. Id. at 626.
13. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
14. Id. at 281.
15. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
16. Id. at 200.
17. Id.
18. Allied Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282.
2007]
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the local company in Alabama.19 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the
FAA would pre-empt the field in every case that could be reached by the
commerce clause and, as a result, to the extent that the FAA was applicable,
it would pre-empt state laws to the extent that they were not consistent with
the Act.20
In Buckeye the Supreme Court identified three distinct types of
challenges to arbitration agreements in FAA cases. The first type addressed
specifically the validity of the portion of the contract regarding agreement
to arbitrate. The second type challenged the contract as a whole, either on
a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (i.e., the agreement was
procured as a result of fraud or misrepresentation, etc.) or on the ground that
the legality of one of the contract provisions rendered the entire contract
invalid. The third type of challenge was whether any agreement between the
alleged obligor and obligee was ever created and concluded (focusing on
issues such as whether the alleged obligor ever executed the contract
containing the arbitration clause, whether the person signing the contract
with the arbitration clause lacked authority to bind the alleged principal
and/or whether the person executing the contract lacked the mental capacity
to assent as a matter of law).
Buckeye addressed the second type of challenge, namely whether
challenges to the validity of the contract as a whole based on fraudulent
inducement or illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the
entire contract, inclusive of the arbitration provision, invalid. In Buckeye,
Respondent Cardegna initiated a class action against Buckeye, alleging that
Buckeye made illegal usurious loans disguised as check cashing
transactions.2' In response, Buckeye filed a motion to compel arbitration,
based on an arbitration provision contained in the Deferred Deposit and
Disclosure Agreement.22 This provision stated, in relevant part:
Arbitration provisions. Any claim, dispute, or controversy
(whether in contract, tort or otherwise, whether pre-existing,
present, or future, and including statutory, common law, intentional
tort, and equitable claims) arising from or relating to this
Agreement ...or the validity, enforceability, or scope of this
Arbitration Provision or the entire Agreement (collectively
"Claim"), shall be resolved, upon the election of you or us or said
third-parties, by binding arbitration pursuant to this Arbitration
19.Id.
20. Id.
21. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 443.
22. Id.
[Vol. 53:73
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Provision .... This arbitration Agreement is made pursuant to a
transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall be governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA'), 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16.
The arbitration shall apply applicable substantive law constraint
[sic] with the FAA and applicable statu[t]es of limitations and shall
honor claims of privilege recognized by law ....
The trial court denied Buckeye's motion to compel arbitration, holding that
it was within the province of the court to decide a contract illegality claim.24
Buckeye appealed to the Florida Court of Appeals, asserting that the
decision was in violation of the severability doctrine enunciated in Prima
Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.2' The Florida Court of
Appeals agreed with Buckeye but the respondents appealed. The Florida
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision, reasoning that to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful
"could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but is also
criminal in nature .,26
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court
decision. First, the Supreme Court addressed the question of who decides
allegations of contract validity-a court or an arbitrator. Relying on Prima
Paint, the Supreme Court noted that "challenges to the validity of
arbitration agreements "'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract' can be divided into two types. 27 The first
type challenges specifically the validity of an agreement to arbitrate.28 The
other challenges the agreement as a whole, either on a ground that directly
affects the contract as a whole, such as fraudulent inducement, or on the
ground that the illegality of one of the contract's provisions renders the
23. Id. at 442-43.
24. Id. at 448-49.
25. 388 U.S. 396 (1967). Prima Paint, as alluded to earlier in text, was the culmination
of a series of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals focusing on the character of the FAA, and whether it was a procedural
enactment that could dislodge state law in diversity and non-diversity cases. See Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1950) (holding that permitting claims to be
submitted through the federal courts in diversity cases might lead to outcomes not
contemplated by state law, thus undermining the directives of Erie); see also Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2nd Cir. 1959) (holding that the
FAA represented federal substantive law on arbitration agreements, since questions of
contract interpretation and contract validity are inextricably intertwined).
26. 546 U.S. at 443 (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
27.Id. at 444.
28. Id.
2007]
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entire contract invalid.29 Here, respondents' claim was deemed to be of the
second type.3" "The crux of the complaint is that the contract as a whole
(including its arbitration provision) is rendered invalid by the usurious
finance charge.' In this circumstance, the statutory language of the FAA
does not permit a federal court to adjudicate the claim. As a matter of
substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable
from the remainder of the contract. Unless the challenge is to the arbitration
clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is one to be considered by
an arbitrator, not a court.
As to the question of whether the doctrine of severability in Prima
Paint applied in state court, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
emerges not from sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, but rather the foundational
provision of section 2, which commands that arbitration agreements be
treated like all other contracts.32 Relying on Southland v. Keating,33 the
Supreme Court stated that Congress did not intend to limit the Federal
Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction.34 Thus,
regardless of whether the challenge is brought in state or federal court, a
challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, even if later deemed by
an arbitrator to be void, is one for an arbitrator to decide.
Justice Thomas dissented, stating that the Federal Arbitration Act does
not apply to proceedings in state court, since the FAA cannot serve as the
basis for displacing a state law that prohibits enforcement of an arbitration
clause in a contract that might be deemed unenforceable given its illegal
character.35
As a result of the Supreme Court's opinion in the Buckeye case, it is
now clear that the question of who decides whether or not the dispute will
be arbitrated depends upon the type of challenge made to arbitration
agreements in cases to which the FAA applies. Specifically, challenges that
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 444-46.
33. 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984).
34. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445 (reasoning that, "[o]ne of the bases for Southland's
application § 2 in state court was precisely Prima Paint's "reli[ance] for [its] holding on
Congress' broad power to fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause"). Id. at
447.
35. Id. at 449. Justice Thomas' dissent in Allied-Bruce foreshadowed his dissent in
Buckeye, which continued to cast the Federal Arbitration Act as a procedural statute.
Specifically to this point, Justice Thomas stated, "An arbitration agreement is a species of
forum-selection clause: without laying down any rules of decision, it identifies the
adjudicator of disputes. A strong argument can be made that such forum-selection clauses
concern procedure rather than substance." Dobson, 513 U.S. at 289.
[Vol. 53:73
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go the validity of the portion of the agreement requiring arbitration only are
for the court to decide (i.e., whether the arbitration clause portion of the
contract was procured as a result of fraud, misrepresentation, or some other
inappropriate conduct). By implication, the question of whether an
agreement within the scope of the FAA was ever concluded between the
parties (such as an issue dealing with whether or not the alleged obligor
ever signed the contract or had authority to do so) is determined by the
court. However, any and all challenges to the contract as a whole, whether
on grounds that affect the entire agreement or on grounds that the legality
of a portion of the agreement render the entire contract invalid, are to be
determined by the arbitrator (or arbitration panel) to which the case has
been assigned.36
To be sure, the result in Buckeye was not nuanced. The Supreme Court
merely re-affirmed the importance of Prima Paint's severability doctrine,
and made clear in its opinion that those who challenge a contract based on
illegality, which may render the contract void ab initio, will not necessarily
defeat an otherwise viable arbitration clause. This ruling is consistent with
the Supreme Court's pronounced desire to avoid dilatory or frivolous
objections to arbitration, and also preserve the character of arbitration
sketched in the FAA.37
36. While the court did not address specifically the third issue as to whether the person
signing had authority or lacked the mental capacity to enter into a valid and enforceable
contract, a number of federal courts have addressed those types of issues and by implication,
therefore, it would appear that questions falling within the scope of that category are to be
determined by the court and not the arbitrator. See Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir.
2003) (holding that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court and not an arbitrator should
decide mental capacity challenge to contract providing for arbitration of all disputes, relying
on the Prima Paint doctrine that a court may compel arbitration of particular dispute under
§ 4 of the FAA only when satisfied that the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate is not at
issue). But see Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that
a claim that one of the parties lacked the capacity to contract must be submitted to the
arbitrator, rationalizing that capacity defense did not relate specifically to the arbitration
clause but was rather part of the underlying dispute).
37. Interestingly, the English courts decided a comparable case during the Survey
period. OAO Sovcomflot, Russia's largest shipper, initiated proceedings in London's High
Court against former employees and their companies, alleging that various shipping deals
resulted from bribery. The contracts included an arbitration clause. The London Court of
Appeals permitted the case to proceed to arbitration, stating "[i]t is not enough to say that
the bribery impeaches the whole contract unless there is some special reason for saying that
the bribery impeaches the arbitration clause in particular. There is no such reason here." The
London Court of Appeals focused on the importance of liberally construing the arbitration
clause, i.e., the presumption favoring "one-stop arbitration." The appellate court emphasized
that "commercial man" would not knowingly create a system that requires a court to initially
decide whether a contract should be rectified or rescinded and if held to be valid, then
requires the arbitrator to resolve the underlying issue. Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Yuri
2007]
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B. Procedural versus Substantive Arbitrability; Time-Limitation Bar
In a case involving a more traditional arbitrability question, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals decided whether a time bar in a collective
bargaining agreement constituted a question of procedural arbitrability. s
This case was one of the few surprise decisions of the Survey period, since
the Sixth Circuit treated the time bar as a limitation on arbitration generally,
thus precluding an arbitrator from deciding the merits of the claim.39
Gobain, which manufactures refractory products for industrial clients,
entered into a collective bargaining relationship with the United
Steelworkers. Several years into their collective bargaining relationship,
Gobain fired two employees for insubordination.40 The union grieved.4 The
parties' collective bargaining agreement ("c/b/a") included a four-step
process for resolving grievances, the last step of which was arbitration.42 On
March 29, 2004, Gobain issued its formal denial with respect to both
grievances.43 Under the parties' c/b/a, the union had 30 days from which to
notice the appeal of the grievances' denials." The union informed the
company of its decision to appeal in a letter dated May 19 which the
company received on May 24." The company refused to arbitrate, asserting
that the union violated the time limits explicitly stated in the parties' c/b/a.46
The union filed suit in federal district court under section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act to compel arbitration of the grievances. The
district court held the grievances to be inarbitrable, and the union
appealed.47
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by framing the question-whether
a collective bargaining agreement commits a dispute to arbitration is a
question of substantive arbitrability for the courts to decide. By contrast, the
question of whether the parties have complied with the procedural
requirements is for the arbitrator to determine. Where the line is murky
between what is procedural and what is substantive, the presumption of
Privalov, Case No: 2006 2353 A3 QBCMF, [2007] EWCA civ. 20; decided Jan. 24, 2007.
38. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics,
Inc., 467 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006).
39. Id. at 547.
40. Id. at 541.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Saint Gobain Ceramics, 467 F.3d at 541-42.
45. Id. at 542.
46. Id.
47. Id.
[Vol. 53:73
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arbitrability which operates in this context places the question squarely
before the arbitrator.
The Sixth Circuit held that the time limitations bar constituted a
condition precedent to arbitration, and thus was a question for the court, and
not the arbitrator, to determine.48 Under Moog,49 a time limitation embedded
in the steps of a collective bargaining grievance process is the equivalent of
an express time-limitations bar." As such, it constitutes a question of
substantive arbitrability which must be determined by a court.
Having determined that the matter was one of substantive arbitrability,
the Sixth Circuit then decided whether the union satisfied the time limits set
forth in the c/b/a. Under the c/b/a, the union had 30 days from the time of
the written Step 3 decision to notify the company that it intended to appeal,
and file for arbitration. The company issued its written denial of the Step 3
grievance on March 29, it was received by the union on April 8, and the
decisions were appealed on May 19 (Saturdays, Sundays, holidays and off
days did not count toward the 30 days). The main question was when the
clock started to run, i.e., on March 29 when the company denied the
grievances, or on April 8 when the union received the notice of the
company's denial. The language in the contract read, "from the time of the
written Step 3 decision." This language favored the company's
interpretation that the clock started to run on March 29 and not when the
union received the decision. The next sentence of the agreement stated,
"Upon receipt of such notice of appeal to arbitration . . . ." "The
juxtaposition of these two sentences shows that the drafters understood the
difference between a time requirement premised on "receipt" on the one
hand and "the time of... decision" on the other, and we may assume that
they made these linguistic choices intentionally."" The decision of the
district court, which dismissed the union's action to enforce the arbitration
clause, was affirmed. 2
The Sixth Circuit's reticence to take a position contrary to Moog
resulted in a decision that clearly confuses the line of demarcation between
procedural arbitrability and substantive arbitrability. In the context of
collective bargaining agreements, which typically involve intense
bargaining sessions prior to contract ratification, arbitrability determinations
48. Id.
49. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 89 v. Moog Louisville
Warehouse, 852 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1988).
50. Both the language in Moog and the language in Gobain Ceramics included a
specific provision that stated that the failure to comply with the required time limits would
preclude arbitration.
51. Gobain Ceramics, 467 F.3d at 546.
52. Id. at 547.
2007]
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are often left to the arbitrator as an "expert contract-reader."53 Moreover, the
role of federal courts in addressing claims where arbitrability is contested
is restricted by the teachings of the Steelworkers' Trilogy, in which the
Supreme Court stated:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have
agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the
arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on it face is governed by the
contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances
the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's
judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that
was bargained for.54
Despite the Supreme Court's caveats in the Trilogy, the Sixth Circuit's
decision to treat a time-limitation bar as a question of substantive
arbitrability flies in the face of long-standing precedent.55 The end result of
this linguistic imbroglio is two-fold. First, courts are likely to see more
arbitrability claims. Second, courts will now be placed in a position of
having to tease the arbitrability issue from the merits, something that is
difficult for courts to do.
C. Exhausting Conditions Precedent to Arbitration
During the Survey period, the Sixth Circuit addressed the question of
conditions precedent in arbitration and whether language in a contract
which vested authority in the hands of one party to determine the
adjudicatory forum in the event of a dispute could defeat the right to
arbitrate.56 Higley, a primary contractor, hired N/S as a subcontractor."7 The
parties' agreement contained a "Buy America" provision. This provision
53. See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557-58 (1964) (holding that
"a different ruling would produce frequent duplication of effort by court and arbitrator, and
needless delay"). See also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION
WORKS (6th ed. 2003).
54. United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 567-68.
55. Seee.g., John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. 543; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
537 U.S. 79 (2002); see also criticisms of Moog, discussed in Armco Emp. Indep. Fed'n v.
AK Steel Corp., 252 F.3d 854, 860-61 (6th Cir. 2001) and Raceway Park, Inc. v. Local 47,
Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, 167 F.3d 953, 963 (6th Cir. 1999).
56. Albert M. Higley Co. v. N/S Corp., 445 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006).
57. Id. at 862.
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was inserted into the contract by Higley because it affected the use and
availability of Federal Transit Administration funds. During contract
performance, N/S informed Higley that he would not be able to comply
with the "Buy America" provision.5" After pursuing negotiation and
mediation, Higley sued N/S for breach in federal district court, under
diversity jurisdiction. N/S filed a motion to stay the litigation and compel
arbitration, which was denied. N/S appealed.
The Sixth Circuit observed that while there is a strong federal policy in
favor of arbitration, that policy is not absolute.59 Arbitration is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and a clear expression of party intent will govern
disposition of the issue.6" Here, the parties' arbitration clause, contained in
the Subcontract, provided that should N/S and Higley be unable to resolve
their disputes through mediation, any and all disputes, at the sole discretion
of Higley, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. 61 This
clause vested in Higley the discretion to decide the forum-either
arbitration or litigation. The district court's decision denying N/S's motion
to stay litigation and to compel arbitration was affirmed and remanded for
further proceedings.62
It is clear from the holding in this case that the appellate court,
appropriately so, restrained itself from re-writing the contract of the parties.
The opinion illustrates what can occur when human dynamics, which focus
on creating and preserving the relationship, interface with contract
formation issues. More foresight in the drafting stage might have
culminated in an agreement that would have permitted either party to make
an election to arbitrate. Despite the unevenness of the contractual terms, 6 3
N/S did not assert fraud or unconscionability, claims that might otherwise
permit the Sixth Circuit to penetrate the language of the contract. Neither
was the arbitration clause ambiguous. The real trigger for N/S' challenge
was adroitly captured by the Sixth Circuit: "Hindsight is 20/20 and no
contract could possibly hold up to the scrutiny of the inquiry N/S would
have us undertake-that is N/S asks us to consider whether the clause could
have been written better given the dispute that developed between the
58. Id. at 862-63.
59. Id. at 863.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 863-64.
62. Higley,. 445 F.3d at 865.
63. The Subcontract also gave Higley sole discretion to select the commercial
mediation service and the power to decide the location of the mediation or arbitration. Id.
at 861.
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parties."'
III. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
A. Forum Inaccessibility; Cost-Deterrent Analysis under Green Tree
Unlike a judicial proceeding, parties in arbitration are required to
privately compensate the arbitrator. In addition to compensation for the
neutral, parties also pay a forum fee. This fee is often significantly greater
than the filing fee in court. The subject of costs and fees in arbitration has
received public attention.65 One study, published in 2002, found that
arbitration "saddles claimants with a plethora of extra fees that they would
not be charged if they went to court."66 This report went on to excoriate
arbitration as an employer-driven or controlled process which places
plaintiffs at a distinct disadvantage in arbitration. At a minimum, the
forum/access fees have a deterrent effect, which at times prevents a
claimant {plaintiff in arbitration] from even asserting a claim.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question of fees in
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,67 holding that where an
agreement is silent on the question of arbitration fees and costs, and a party
seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing
the likelihood of incurring such costs.68
Lower courts are split on how to handle forum fees. Some courts have
simply stated that the employee should not have to pay any fees and
expenses when the employer requires arbitration as a condition of
employment. 69 The underlying rationale for this position is found in the
64. Id.
65. See also David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary
Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment
Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J EMP & LAB L 1 (2003); see also Edward
Burnett, Seeking OptimalDispute Resolution Clauses in High Stakes Employment Contracts,
23 BERKELEY J EMP & LAB L 107 (2002); Melissa G. Lamm, Who Pays Arbitration Fees?:
The Unanswered Question in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 93
(2001).
66. Public Citizen, Report on Costs of Arbitration, May 1, 2002, available
at www.citizen.org (accessed from homepage by searching for 'costs of arbitration') (last
visited Nov. 13, 2007).
67. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054 (11 th Cir.
1998); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th
Cir. 1999); and Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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D.C. Circuit decision of Cole v. Burns International Security Services, in
which the appellate court explained, "[W]e are unaware of any situation in
American jurisprudence in which a beneficiary of a federal statute has been
required to pay for the services of the judge assigned to hear her or his
case."7° As a consequence of Cole, many employer-promulgated plans were
revised to impose the financial burden of both forum and neutral
compensation on the employer. Nevertheless, courts continue to examine
the question of whether it is unconscionable to require arbitration without
a fee-shifting provision. A variance of this question was addressed by the
Sixth Circuit during this Survey period in Stutler v. TK. Constructors, Inc.7'
Plaintiffs, the Stutlers, residents of Kentucky, hired T.K., resident of
Indiana, to build a personal residence for them. 72 T.K. completed the project
and provided the Stutlers with a written acceptance of the workmanship.73
Subsequently, the Stutlers noticed defects and requested T.K to perform the
repairs which were covered by a home warranty.74 T.K. performed an initial
inspection, but before any repair work occurred, the Stutlers retained
counsel and initiated court action.75 The filed complaint alleged state law
claims for negligent misrepresentation breach of contract, breach of
warranty, and miscellaneous other claims, resulting in a request for damages
in excess of $100,000.76 The parties' construction project was covered by
a broad arbitration clause that provided that any claims or dispute arising
out of the contract or its breach would be settled by arbitration under the
Construction Rules of the American Arbitration Association unless both
parties mutually agreed otherwise.77 The contract also provided that if a
dispute over workmanship arose, the buyer and the builder would engage
the services of an independent third party inspector to resolve the issue.78
Relying on the contract, T.K. filed a motion to stay litigation.79 The
district court denied T.K.'s motion, finding that the cost of arbitration
would be prohibitive to the Stutlers. 80 T.K. appealed. Since this appeal was
from an order denying a motion to stay litigation, the decision was
70. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
71. 448 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2006).
72. Id. at 344.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Stutler, 448 F.3d at 344.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 345.
80. Id.
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immediately appealable under U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A). s'
Although the Sixth Circuit readily admitted that the disposition of the
appeal was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, it reversed the district
court decision, stating that Morrison2 and Cooper,83 on which the district
court relied, were not applicable.84 Morrison held that "the resolution of an
arbitral civil rights dispute must reconcile the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements with the important rights created and protected by
federal civil rights legislation. 85 Under Morrison, potential litigants must
be able to demonstrate whether the costs of arbitration preclude them from
effectively accessing the arbitral forum.16 Cooper, another Title VII
employment discrimination case, held that the cost-deterrent analysis
required by Morrison was critical to determining whether the underlying
functions of the federal statute would be compromised. s7 The Sixth Circuit
also considered the relevancy of Green Tree. All three of these cases
involved federally protected interests. Here, the Stutlers, through diversity
jurisdiction, sought to enforce contractual rights provided by state law.
Thus, neither Morrison nor Cooper applied. And, even if Morrison and
Cooper were not explicitly limited to the arbitration of federal statutory
rights, Erie R. C. v. Tompkins would preclude their application to a question
of state law. The Sixth Circuit was adamant that Erie not be used as a
springboard to invalidate state law in order to achieve a preference for
federal common law:
[I]f we were to flout Erie by extending Green Tree, Morrison and
81. See e.g., Lloyd v. Hovsena, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (2004) (district court order
compelling arbitration and dismissing party's underlying claims with prejudice was "final
decision with respect to an arbitration" within meaning of Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
provision governing appellate review of arbitration orders, and thus was immediately
appealable. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3); Vetco Sales, Inc. v. Vinar, 98 Fed. Appx. 264 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that district court order denying defendants' motion to stay trial proceedings
pending arbitration was immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 16(a)(1)(A); Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over appeal from district court order that expressly
denied movant's request to compel arbitration and to stay or dismiss proceeding, even
though district court also entered minute order demonstrating its intent to revisit question
of arbitrability following further fact-finding and possibly a trial pursuant to provision of
Federal Arbitration Act allowing for immediate appeal of order refusing stay under Act or
denying petition to compel arbitration).
82. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003).
83. Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004).
84. Stutler, 448 F.3d at 345-46.
85. Id. at 346 (quoting Morrison at 652-53) (Emphasis in opinion).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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Cooper to disputes over purely state law claims, we would, in
effect, limit enforcement of arbitration agreements to situations in
which all of the parties to the agreement are wealthy. This absurd
result, we think, is not what Congress intended when it enacted the
FAA.88
Judge Moore concurring opinion refused to embrace the majority opinion's
condemnation of the district court's decision. Judge Moore held that "the
majority opinion's fervid rejection of the extension of the cost-deterrent
defense to state-law disputes as a matter offederal law"89 was not relevant
to whether such a claim was cognizable under state law. Challenging the
majority for not making an appropriate prediction of what the Kentucky
Supreme Court would do if confronted with the question, Judge Moore
proceeded to examine the analogous case of Conseco Finance Serv. Corp.
v. Wilder,90 which involved the exact arbitration clause in Green Tree.
There, the Kentucky Court of Appeals relied on Green Tree's reasoning to
hold that plaintiff's contention of unconscionability must be rejected based
on plaintiff's existing level of proof. As with Green Tree, Conseco rejected
the attempt to avoid the arbitral forum based on a mere presumption of
unconscionability.
During this Survey period, the Sixth Circuit also decided Scovill v.
WSYX/ABC, Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.,9  a case involving
unconscionability. In Scovill, the plaintiff initiated suit against his former
employer claiming that he was discriminated against on account of his age
in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act.92 Plaintiff also
brought a claim for unlawful retaliation, invasion of privacy, promissory
estoppel, and violation of Ohio public policy.93 The defendants removed the
case to federal court and filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative,
Stay the Action Pending Arbitration because the plaintiff had previously
signed an arbitration agreement.94 The district court held the arbitration
agreement was enforceable, and granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
but severed three provisions from the agreement. On appeal, the plaintiff
argued that the district court erred in finding that the arbitration agreement
was not unconscionable.95
88. Id.
89. Id. at 347-49
90. Stutler, 448 F.3d at 348.
91. 425 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. at 1014.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Under Ohio law, the unconscionability doctrine has two components:
(1) substantive unconscionability, and (2) procedural unconscionability.96
Both elements must be present to find a contract unconscionable.97
Procedural unconscionability exists where the circumstances surrounding
a party to the contract were such that no voluntary meeting of the minds
was possible; it is not enough, however, that the parties have unequal
bargaining power.98 Vast disparity is required. The Sixth Circuit noted that,
in this case, the plaintiff was college-educated, experienced in his
profession, and knowledgeable about arbitration clauses.99 Further, he
admitted reading the agreement, and he was aware of the opportunity to
discuss the agreement. Thus, the appellate court found no procedural
unconscionability, and no further discussion was necessary.
B. InvalidArbitrator-Selection Clause; Severability of Offending Provision
One prolific area of arbitral jurisprudence in recent years has been in
the employment sector. The presumption favoring enforcement of
arbitration of federal and state statutory claims, and claims arising under
state common law1"' faired well in the Sixth Circuit's most recent decision
of McMullen v. Meijer, Inc.,"1 in which the Sixth Circuit addressed the
question of whether an arbitration agreement could survive a deficient
arbitrator selection mechanism. Meijer hired McMullen as a store detective.
Following a workplace incident, McMullen was given the option of
demotion or termination. McMullen chose termination and subsequently
challenged the termination through the employer-promulgated appeal plan
established by Meijer. The termination appeal plan ("TAP") called for a
two-step process, which required Meijer to initially identify the arbitrator
pool from which an arbitrator would be selected, and then conduct
arbitration under the Employment Rules of the American Arbitration
Association. At the time McMullen was hired, Meijer presented her with a
96. Id. at 1017.
97. Scoville, 425 F.3d at 1017.
98. See Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004). (holding that mere
inequality of bargaining power is not a sufficient reason to hold an arbitration agreement
unenforceable).
99. The plaintiff had previously signed such an agreement.
100. See, e.g., Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,23 (1991) (holding
that claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) could
be subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act). Following Gilmer, lower courts
began to enforce arbitration agreements between employer and employee, using Gilmer to
support the presumption favoring arbitration of federal and state statutory claims, and claims
arising under state common law.
101. 166 Fed. Appx. 164 (6th Cir. 2006).
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copy of an employee handbook describing the TAP. McMullen signed an
acknowledgment form assenting to the company's policies and procedures.
McMullen did so after participating in the arbitrator selection process, and
one day before the beginning of her evidentiary hearing, she filed a
declaratory judgment action in state court challenging the fairness of TAP's
arbitrator-selection process.
The case was removed to federal court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction.1 °2 The district court granted summary judgment to Meijer,
issuing an order compelling arbitration (based on the agreement between
McMullen and Meijer that all employment disputes arising out of an
employee's termination would be arbitrated). 0 3 McMullen appealed."
The Sixth Circuit initially recited the procedural history, which included
an earlier challenge of the arbitrator-selection process. In McMullen v.
Meier, Inc.,'15 the appellate court held that the arbitrator-selection process
was flawed in that it provided Meijer with exclusive control over the
arbitrator pool.0 6 The case was remanded to the district court to determine
whether the offending provision could be severed from the contract.'0 7 The
district court held that severance was appropriate where the provision did
not taint the entire contract, and where the parties had clearly expressed
their intent to arbitrate disputes arising from an employee's termination
from employment.0 8 McMullen again appealed, this time asserting that 1)
the district court erred in holding that severance was a proper remedy, and
2) that she could arbitrate her claim under the procedures set forth in AAA's
Employment Arbitration Rules (with an arbitrator selected in accordance
with such rules).'09
In Michigan, general contract law provides that the failure of a distinct
part of the contract does not void valid severable provisions. "o Despite no
express severability clause, the Sixth Circuit held that the parties had
expressly evidenced their intention to arbitrate, and that this intention
should be given effect.
One critical factor in this case was that during oral argument, plaintiff's
attorney was given a hypothetical choice between using the AAA rules or
having the district court appoint an arbitrator. Counsel opted to use the
102. Id. at 165.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 355 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 487.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 485.
109. Id.
110. McMullen, 166 Fed. Appx. 4 at 168.
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AAA rules, which provide a default mechanism for arbitrator selection, in
the event the parties' selection process does yield a mutual choice. 1
C. Common Law Arbitration
In an important case, the Michigan Supreme Court re-visited the
circumstances under which an otherwise statutory arbitration agreement
might default into common law. 2 Common law arbitration typically arises
when a provision to arbitrate future disputes under a contract omits a
provision for entry of judgment upon an award by a circuit court." 3
Incorporating the rules of an arbitral service will satisfy the entry of
judgment requirement. 4 The effect of a common law agreement to arbitrate
future disputes is that the agreement can be revoked by either party at any
time before an award is issued." 5
Wold Architects entered into an agreement to purchase the assets of
Strat, an architectural finn specializing in government and institutional
work. As part of the purchase agreement, Strat entered into a five-year
employment agreement with Wold, under which he would be expected to
develop business and consult. This compensation was based entirely on
profitability of Wold's Troy, Michigan operation. The employment
agreement between the parties included a clause for binding arbitration,
subject to the Voluntary Labor Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. Parties also had an asset purchase agreement.
Unlike the employment agreement, the asset purchase agreement did not
contain an arbitration clause. One of the projects pending at the time of the
transaction was the renovation of the Macomb County courthouse. Strat had
billed the county for fifty-three percent of the total project fee, leaving
forty-seven percent to be collected by Wold upon completion. After the
111. AAA Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule 12: Number,
Qualifications andAppointment ofNeutral Arbitrators; and AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules and Mediation Procedure, Rule 11: Appointment From National Roster.
112. Wold Architects and Engineers v. Strat, 474 Mich. 223, 713 N.W.2d 750 (2006).
113. See THOMAS L. GRAVELLE & MARY A. BEDIKIAN, MICHIGAN PLEADING AND
PRACTICE, Vol. 8A (Callaghan: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, 2d ed. 1994).
114. See, e.g., AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule
48(c): Application to Court and Exclusion ofLiability, which states, "Parties to an arbitration
under these rules shall be deemed to have consented that judgment upon the arbitration
award may be entered in any federal or state court having jurisdiction thereof." Id.
115. See, e.g., Tony Andreski, Inc. v. Ski Brule, Inc., 190 Mich. App. 343,475 N.W.2d
469 (1991); Gaines Twp. v. Carlson, Hohloch, Mitchell & Pietrowski, Inc., 79 Mich. App.
523, 261 N.W.2d 71 (1977); Umbenhower v. Copart, Inc., No. 03-2476-JWL, 2004 WL
2660649 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2004) (restricting the application of the common law rule to
circumstances where arbitration is not governed by statute).
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parties had entered into the respective agreements, however, Wold
concluded, upon inspection, that the project was seventy percent
incomplete. As a result, it began to withhold payments due under the
employment agreement, maintaining that Strat had overstated the
percentage of completion of the courthouse project and other undertakings.
Strat filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration
Association, asserting that it was owed money by Wold. AAA wrote the
parties, and indicated that its commercial arbitration rules were better suited
to resolve the controversy. The commercial rules state that judgment on an
arbitration award may be entered in the circuit court.1 6 The parties did not
agree to this change in writing, and wiring is available to confirm the
parties' agreement on this change. Subsequently, Wold filed a counter-
demand for arbitration, claiming that Strat had billed too much for the work
done on the courthouse. While the arbitration was pending, Wold requested,
in writing, that AAA define the scope of arbitration moving forward.
Shortly afterwards, Wold revoked its agreement to arbitrate, asserting that
Strat's claims fell under the asset purchase agreement, which did not
contain an arbitration clause. The arbitrator, on the other hand, decided that
the arbitration hearing would proceed as scheduled, concluding that the
arbitration provision in the employment agreement could not be revoked
unilaterally.
Wold filed a declaratory judgment action, asserting that the pending
arbitration was invalid because 1) the asset purchase agreement did not
contain an arbitration clause, and 2) that the arbitration provision in the
employment agreement was unilaterally revocable because it did not
contain the requisite statutory language relative to specific enforcement." 7
The circuit court disagreed, stating that the claims submitted to AAA could
be arbitrated without irreparable harm to Wold."8 The arbitration continued,
resulting in a $104,559.27 award in favor of Strat, who then filed a
summary disposition motion. Strat contended that there was no longer a
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the parties had a valid
arbitration agreement that comported with the statutory requirements. 19
Wold moved to vacate, which the trial court denied, granting Strat's motion
for summary disposition. 20 Wold appealed to the Court of Appeals,
resulting in a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.' 2' The Michigan
116. Wold, 474 Mich. at 227, 713 N.W.2d at 753.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 226, 713 N.W.2d at 752.
121. Id.
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Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals
decision.'22 The Court recognized the distinction between statutory and
common-law arbitration, with the primary difference being that in common
law, parties are not divested of the power to unilaterally revoke agreements
made pursuant to MCL section 600.5001.123 Because the parties' agreement
did not include the statutory language of enforcement, the parties by default
fell subject to the dictates of common law arbitration. Under common law,
one party to the agreement may terminate arbitration at any time before the
arbitrator renders an award. 12
4
Having determined that the parties were operating under a common law
arbitration agreement, the Michigan Supreme Court next addressed the
question of whether the Legislature pre-empted it when it enacted the
Michigan Arbitration Act. The Court examined the language of the
arbitration statute and concluded that it did not demonstrate an intention to
abrogate the common-law option.1 5 "Statutory and common-law
agreements to arbitrate have long co-existed ... Nothing in the MAA
indicates that the Legislature intended to change this existing law."' 126 As
further support, the Michigan Supreme Court pointed to MCL section
600.501, which specifically removes from its purview all agreements to
arbitrate that do not conform to MCL section 600.5001(1) or (2). 127
Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
common-law arbitration agreements retained their unilateral revocability.
Common law arbitration formed at a time when courts were skeptical of
arbitration. Recognizing that this skepticism no longer exists, the Court was
not persuaded to alter the common law arbitration unilateral revocation rule.
"The unilateral revocation rule protects the right to bring suit when claims
arise that a party did not anticipate and would not want handled outside the
courts' direct protection. The Legislature has determined that public policy
concerns do not require abrogation of the unilateral revocation rule, and we
122. Wold, 474 Mich. at 226,713 N.W.2d at 752.
123. Id. at 238, 713 N.W.2d at 759. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5001(1) provides
for statutory arbitration, and states:
All persons, except infants and persons of unsound mind, may, by an instrument
in writing, submit to the decision of I or more arbitrators any controversy existing
between them, which might the subject of a civil action, except as herein
otherwise provided, and may, in such submission, agree that ajudgment of any
circuit court shall be rendered upon the award made pursuant to such submission.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5001(1) (West 2000) (emphasis added).
124. Wold. 474 Mich. at 226, 713 N.W.2d at 752.
125. Id. at 231, 713 N.W.2d at 755.
126. Id. at 232, 713 N.W.2d at 756.
127. Id.
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see no need to contravene that determination." 128 Since the parties'
agreement in this case did not meet the writing requirement of MCL section
600.5001 et seq, the parties had, by default, a common law arbitration
agreement. And, although the parties acquiesced in using the commercial
arbitration rules of the AAA, that did not change the fact that there was no
written agreement containing the required language. Justice Corrigan wrote
separately to urge the Legislature to consider disposing of the unilateral
revocability rule.
129
This case presents an interesting scenario in that the parties' contract
called for the use of AAA's "Labor Arbitration Rules." Unlike the
commercial rules, the labor rules (which apply to collective bargaining
disputes) do not include a specific enforcement provision. Had the parties
agreed in writing to use the commercial rules, it is the opinion of this author
that the result in Wold would have been different. The lesson of this case is
that mere acquiescence is not enough for a common law arbitration
agreement to be transformed into statutory arbitration. This decision is
consistent with the view that arbitration should be a matter of consent, not
coercion, and that parties are free to structure their arbitration as they see fit,
including preserving the right to revoke their consent to arbitration.
This straight-forward, traditional analysis of common law arbitration
principles was adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals in City of
Ferndale v. Florence Cement Company.130 In City ofFerndale, the plaintiff
entered into a contract with the defendant, Florence Cement Company to
install new concrete for a roadway in the city. Defendant, Hartford Casualty
Insurance Company provided a maintenance and guarantee bond on the
work performed by Florence. The parties' contract established an appeal
process that would be invoked in the event the project engineer, Giffels-
Webster Engineers declared the work to be defective. The project manager
for the engineer notified Florence that the plaintiff was seeking replacement
of 300 yards of concrete due to a defect and therefore was requesting that
Florence perform full-depth repairs. Florence responded by proposing an
alternative remedy which the plaintiff rejected.
Defendants filed a joint motion for summary disposition arguing that,
under the parties' contract, the engineer's determination constituted an
arbitration award that Plaintiff did not seek to enforce within one year of the
engineer's "decision," and therefore plaintiff's claim was time-barred. '31 In
opposition to the summary disposition motion, plaintiff argued that because
128. Id. at 237, 713 N.W.2d at 758.
129. Id. at 239-40, 713 N.W.2d at 759-60.
130. 269 Mich. App. 452, 712 N.W.2d 522 (2006).
131. Id. at 455-56, 712 N.W.2d at 525.
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the engineer "ruled" in its favor, the decision became binding when
Florence failed to appeal. Further, plaintiff argued that the parties' contract
controlled and not MCR 3.602(1) because the parties' agreement did not
contain an arbitration clause.
The trial court held that plaintiff s claim was time-barred. '32 Relying on
City ofHuntington Woods v. Ajax Paving Indus.,33 the trial court stated that
because the parties' agreement provided for a contractually agreed method
of ADR that designated the engineer's decision as "final and binding" if the
appellate procedures were not followed, the engineer's ruling constituted a
final arbitration award subject to the one-year limitation period in MCL
section 3.602(l)."' Plaintiff appealed.135
The Michigan Court of Appeals first discussed the requisites of contract
formation as they apply to the existence of an arbitration agreement. Under
the Michigan arbitration statutes, an agreement to arbitrate is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable if the agreement provides that a circuit court
can render judgment on the arbitration award. 136 Such intent must be clearly
and unambiguously conveyed.' Here, the parties' agreement did not
contain an arbitration clause nor did it specify that any resultant aware was
enforceable in a court of competent jurisdiction. Moreover, the parties did
not make a "Dispute Resolution Agreement" part of their contract. It is only
through this vehicle that a circuit court may obtain jurisdiction to enforce
the agreement and renderjudgment. Since the agreement did not provide for
statutory arbitration, MCR 3.602(1), which governs the confirmation of a
statutory arbitration award, was deemed inapplicable.
132. Id.
133. 196 Mich. App. 71, 492 N.W.2d 463 (1992).
134. Id. at 72, 492 N.W.2d at 464. The controlling language stated, "ENGINEER will
render a formal decision in writing within thirty days after receipt of the opposing party's
submittal, if any, in accordance with this paragraph. ENGINEER's written decision on such
claim, dispute, or other matter will be final and binding upon OWNER and CONTRACTOR
unless: (i) an appeal from ENGINEERS's decision is taken within the time limits and in
accordance with the procedures set forth in EXHIBIT GCA, "Dispute Resolution
Agreement," entered into between OWNER and CONTRACTOR... or (ii) if no such
Dispute Resolution Agreement has been entered into, a written notice of intention to appeal
from ENGINEER's written decision is delivered by OWNER or CONTRACTOR to the
other and to ENGINEER within thirty days after the date of such decision and a formal
proceeding is instituted by the appealing party in a forum of competent jurisdiction to
exercise such rights or remedies as the appealing party may have with respect to such claim,
dispute or other matter in accordance with applicable Laws and Regulations within sixty
days of the date of such decision, unless otherwise agreement (sic) in writing by OWNER
and CONTRACTOR." Ferndale, 269 Mich. App. at 452, 712 N.W.2d at 522.
135. Ajax Paving,. 196 Mich. App.at 71, 492 N.W.2d at 463.
136. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5001(2) (West 2000).
137. Id.
[Vol. 53:73
HeinOnline -- 53 Wayne L. Rev. 96 2007
2007] AL TERNA TIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IV. VACATUR OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
A. Manifest Disregard of the Law
The Federal Arbitration Act specifies limited statutory grounds on
which an award may be vacated.1 38 Despite this, courts have supplemented
the act with non-statutory grounds for vacatur. One such ground is where
the arbitrators have acted in "manifest disregard of the law."' 39 This
standard initially appeared in Wilko v. Swan, 4 ' where the United States
Supreme Court stated, "the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation."4' Since Wilko, the federal courts
continue to struggle with this judicially-devined standard. 42 An acute
example of the struggle is the following Sixth Circuit decision.
In Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the manifest disregard of the law
standard. In that situation, the arbitrators' determined that the original
contract's no-damages clause did not extend to the profit-splitting
agreement, leaving the court to determine whether such a determination
138. U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. Grounds include undue means, evident partiality, misconduct,
and imperfect execution of powers. "A nearly irrebuttable presumption exists in the federal
case law that arbitral awards, once rendered, are legally enforceable. The vacatur of an
award remains an unusual result." THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN ANUTSHELL,
77 (West 2007).
139. DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (1997).
140. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
141. Id. at 436-37.
142. The difficulties in applying the standard are evident from the recentjurisprudence.
"The Second Circuit severely limits the doctrine of manifest disregard of the law, describing
it as 'a doctrine of last resort-its use is limited only to those exceedingly rare instances
where some egregious impropriety on the part of the arbitrators is apparent, but where none
of the provisions of the FAA apply." MetLife Securities, Inc. v. Bedford, 456 F.Supp.2d 468
(2006) (quoting Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383,
389 (2nd Cir. 2003)). "Generally, arbitrators' decisions must be granted great deference, and
may be vacated for manifest disregard of the law only if the Court finds both that (1) the
arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it
altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly
applicable to the case." "[I]n applying the manifest disregard of the law test for whether to
vacate an arbitration award, an arbitrator is ordinarily assumed to be a blank slate unless
educated in the law by the parties." MetLife Securities, 456 F.Supp.2d at 473 (2006); see
also Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 1998) (reversing the district
court's order refusing to vacate an award where the arbitrators were correctly advised of the
applicable legal principles, but they ignored the law or the evidence or both).
143. 442 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2006).
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"drew its essence" from both documents.' 44 Duramed and Solvay entered
into a series of agreements related to the marketing of a new menopause
drug. The specific agreement that gave rise to the case involved the
Cenestin Co-Promotion Agreement (CPA), which provided that Solvay's
services, not cash, would serve as consideration for Duramed's services
under the related agreements. The CPA stated that if the parties failed to
negotiate a long-term agreement after the agreement expired, and one of the
parties terminated the CPA afterwards, there would be a penalty. Duramed
was required to pay Solvay a "residual payment" equal to five percent of
Cenestin's gross margin in the final quarter of the CPA, every quarter for
the subsequent five years.
The CPA also included two other important provisions-a "no
damages" provision and an arbitration provision. Duramed's financial
condition deteriorated and it could no longer afford to pay its sales force to
market Cenestin. To stabilize the situation, Solvay agreed to guarantee a
twenty million dollar loan to Duramed by Merrill Lynch Business Financial
Services, Inc.. Memorialized in a letter "agreement," the guarantee was
linked to the CPA, extended the CPA's term, required Solvay to pay
additional marketing expenses, and included a shifting profit-sharing
arrangement. Unlike the CPA, the Letter Agreement did not contain a
"termination without cause" provision, an "exclusive remedy/no damages"
provision, a "damages for termination" provision, or an arbitration
provision.
Although Solvay spent nearly $100 million to promote Cenestin, sales
continued to lag. The parties were unsuccessful in their attempts to reach a
broader alliance as contemplated by the initially-executed CPA. Duramed
subsequently gave notice that it intended to terminate the initial agreement
and the subsequent Letter Agreement, along with a related agreement
executed at the outset of the business relationship. In response, Solvay filed
arbitration seeking damages for Duramed's alleged breach of the ten-year
investment recovery, and the profit-split arrangement under the Letter
Agreement. Arbitration resulted in a split decision, awarding Solvay 68
million dollars in damages, and determining that the exclusive remedy/no
damages provision did not apply to Duramed's breach of the Letter
Agreement.'45 Solvay filed a motion to confirm the arbitration, and
Duramed opposed confirmation and filed a motion to vacate. The district
court confirmed the appeal, and Duramed appealed. 146
The Sixth Circuit first distinguished its review function by assessing the
144. Id. at 482.
145. Id. at 475.
146. Id.
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type of question presented. If the issue presented is one of pure arbitrability,
i.e., whether the matter is even capable of being arbitrated, then the level of
review is heightened. In that instance, the appellate court would be
governed by First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,4 ' where the United
States Supreme Court indicated that the question of who should decide pure
questions ofarbitrability is predicated on whether the parties expressed their
intent in a clear and unmistakable manner. "[A]bsent 'clear and
unmistakable' evidence that contracting parties intended an arbitrator
(rather than a court) to resolve questions of arbitrability, courts 'should
independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over the
merits of any particular dispute.""' 148 "Courts thus review questions of
arbitrability de novo, but with a thumb on the scale in favor of
arbitration.' ' 149 Whether a contract provision implicates arbitrability is
divined in several ways. 5' First, one may consider the location of the
targeted provision. "If the limitation appears in close proximity to the
arbitration clause," it would be reasonable to conclude that this constitutes
a limitation on the proper subjects of arbitration.151 If the limitation appears
in distant proximity to the arbitration clause, it is reasonable to conclude
that the parties did not intend to limit the subjects of arbitration. 152 Courts
also may engage in a functional inquiry, asking parties to express their
preference for an industry-based resolution, or a more "searching judicial
review" undertaken by the court.
15 3
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "exclusive remedy/no
damages" provision "did not bear on arbitrability."' 54 As such, the appellate
court was required to apply the standard of substantial deference to the
arbitrators' determination that the clause did not apply to breaches of the
Letter Agreement. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court examined
the location of the "exclusive remedy/no damages" provision in Section 13,
and compared it to the singular arbitration provision in Section 22. The
arbitration agreement broadly encompassing "[any dispute, controversy,
or claim arising out of or relating to [the agreement].' '155 Had the parties
intended to limit the matters eligible for arbitration, they should have
included qualifying language. In addition, the CPA agreement contained an
147. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 938.
148. Solvay, 442 F.3d at 477 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 941, 945).
149. Id. at 478.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Solvay, 442 F.3d at 480.
155. Id. at 481. (emphasis in opinion).
2007]
HeinOnline -- 53 Wayne L. Rev. 99 2007
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
explicit provision with respect to termination, default, and exclusive
remedy, under "this agreement."'' 56 The third indication that the "exclusive
remedy/no damages" provision did not impact or concern arbitrability was
that complex monetary awards in certain circumstances could issue, even
under the CPA.
Given the above analysis, the appellate court determined that judicial
intervention was warranted only if the award: (1) conflicts with the express
terms of the agreement; (2) imposes additional requirements not expressly
provided for in the agreement; (3) is not rationally supported by or derived
from the agreement; or (4) is based on "general considerations of fairness
and equity" instead of the exact terms of the agreement.'57 Under this
standard, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the arbitrators'
decision, awarding damages to Solvay, was legally plausible and should be
confirmed. The judgment of the district court was thus affirmed.
InElectronic Data Systems Corp. v. Donelson,15 8 the Sixth Circuit again
confronted the manifest disregard standard, this time in the context of an
employment agreement. Donelson and Lotts, both African-American,
worked for Electronic Data Systems (EDS). Each was subsequently
terminated from employment for different reasons. During the time of their
termination, their immediate supervisor was Caucasian. This supervisor also
participated in the termination of two other African-American employees.
No Caucasians were terminated during the same period.
Donelson and Lotts filed separate suits against EDS alleging that their
termination was driven by racial discrimination and, with respect to Lotts
specifically, a separate claim was asserted for disability discrimination.'59
Subsequently, Donelson and Lotts agreed to submit their respective claims
to arbitration. The arbitration was conducted, with briefing and award
deadlines established. When the arbitrators failed to render their award
within the prescribed deadline, EDS submitted a written objection to the
panel, stating that by exceeding the time allotted for rendering the award,
the panel was without authority to issue a decision. The panel proceeded to
award money damages to each claimant, without any specific findings of
fact or conclusions of law, and subsequently, after appropriate briefing, also
awarded attorney fees to each claimant. EDS moved in federal district court
to vacate the arbitration awards. The district court denied the motion.1 60
156. Id. at 483.
157. Id. at 482-83 (quoting Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Akron Newspaper Guild, Local
No. 7, 114 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1997)).
158. 473 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2007).
159. Id. at 687.
160. Id.
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EDS appealed from this decision.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, court review of an arbitrator's
decision is limited in scope.'6 1 One ground for vacatur is where the
arbitration panel exceeds its powers. 62 EDS argued that the arbitration
panel exceeded their power by first failing to set forth findings of fact and
conclusions of law, as required by the Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, 163 and
second, by awarding attorney fees and costs to both claimants in arbitration,
despite the fact that the arbitration agreement provided only for an award
of damages.
The Sixth Circuit rejected EDS' first argument. Although the Elliot
Larsen Civil Rights Act does not discuss arbitration, federal and state courts
favor arbitration to resolve statutory claims provided the procedures in
arbitration are deemed fair.64 In Rembert,65 the Michigan Court of Appeals
imposed a requirement that arbitral awards include findings of fact, as a
necessary predicate to establishing the fairness of the arbitration process.
However, the holding in Rembert is limited to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. 66 Here, the agreement to arbitrate was executed after the
alleged statutory violations had taken place, and indeed, after both
claimants had initiated suit in state court. With respect to the awards of
attorney fees and costs, the appellate court observed that EDS was an
accomplice to numerous delays and extensions throughout the course of the
arbitration. It was therefore disingenuous for them to argue that the panel
exceeded its authority to award fees and costs.
Finally, EDS asserted that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded
the law by refusing to require Donelson and Lotts to establish aprimafacie
case of discrimination. The Sixth Circuit recognized that under Gavin'6 7 and
other pertinent jurisprudence, a manifest disregard of the law standard is
very narrow. "An arbitration must fly in the face of established legal
precedent' for us to find manifest disregard of the law.' 68 Furthermore,
arbitrators are not required to explain their decisions.' 69 In this case, even
though the arbitrators did not proffer an explanation of their award, the
record reflects sufficient evidence supporting the arbitral decision. First, the
161. Id. at 688.
162. Id.
163. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2101 et seq. (West 2001).
164. Donelson, 473 F.3d at 360 (citing Rembert v. Ryan's, 596 N.W.2d 208 at 210).
165. Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 235 Mich. App. 118, 596 N.W.2d
208 (1999)).
166. Id.
167. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
168. Dawanare v. Spencer, 210 F.3d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 2000).
169. Id.
20071
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supervisor's office contained a black-faced doll suspended by its neck.
Second, the supervisor participated in the termination of four African-
American employees. Third, during this same period of time, no Caucasian
employees were terminated. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, which concluded that the arbitrators did not
manifestly disregard the law.
B. Evident Partiality
One of the more litigious areas in recent years deals with arbitral
disclosures, and the impact of failing to disclose a "disclosable event. "70
Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2),
as well as section 12(a)(2) of the Uniform Arbitration Act and Section
23(a)(2)(A) of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), provide that
an arbitration award may be vacated for "evident partiality" of the
arbitrator.
The Sixth Circuit addressed the disclosure question in Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. 7' Nationwide filed suit against Home for breach
of a reinsurance contract that the parties had entered into in 1977. The
district court referred the parties to arbitration, pursuant to the terms of an
arbitration clause in the parties' reinsurance agreement. Interim decisions
.of the arbitrators were challenged in court during various stages of
arbitration. After the Sixth Circuit decided Nationwide 111,172 the parties
proceeded to a hearing on the merits before a three-member arbitration
panel. The panel awarded Home the sum of $1,250,000 in costs and
interests. 73
Subsequently, Nationwide filed suit in district court to vacate the final
award along with two interim rulings of the arbitration panel. Home cross-
motioned for confirmation. The district court denied Nationwide's motion
170. See Cross v. Costello, BC 313366 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004) in which a Los Angeles
Superior Court judge allowed a lawsuit alleging fraud, fraudulent concealment, breach of
contract, negligence and violation of Business Code Section 17200 and initiated by partners
of a former LA firm to proceed against the arbitrator who presided over their law firm
breakup dispute. In their suit, plaintiffs asserted that the arbitrator and the American
Arbitration Association, which furnished the name of the appointed arbitrator, concealed
important background information about the arbitrator that would have cast doubts on his
ability to remain neutral throughout the proceedings.
171. 429 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005), rehearing en banc denied (Feb. 16, 2006).
172. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Nationwide 1); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Nationwide I/); and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.
2003) (Nationwide III).
173. Nationwide II, 429 F.3d at 642.
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for vacatur. 7" Nationwide appealed, asserting evident partiality in violation
of FAA 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) based on an arbitrator's alleged nondisclosure
of certain business and social relationships with Home. Specifically,
Nationwide stated that Jacks, a member of the arbitration panel, failed to
disclose both business and social relationships with Home and its counsel,
and also conducted improper ex-parte contacts with one of Home's
attorneys and with employees of CIGNA and ACE. 75
In assessing the effects of nondisclosure, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals looked to Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas.
Co. 176 In Commonwealth Coatings, the United States Supreme Court, in a
divided opinion, held that an arbitrator's failure to disclose a significant
business relationship with the successful party in arbitration justified
vacating the arbitration award for evident partiality. 177 The plurality opinion
indicated that arbitrators, like judges, must avoid even the appearance of
bias.178 Two other justices concurred in the result, but declined to hold that
arbitrators are to be held to the Article III standards ofjudicial decorum.'7 9
In this case, the arbitration agreement required that 1) arbitrators come
from within the insurance industry and 2) that the arbitration panel would
be comprised of a tri-partite panel consisting of two party-appointed
arbitrators and a single neutral. 8° By virtue of this language, the parties
agreed to submit their disputes to persons who are knowledgeable about the
dynamics of the insurance industry. "Since they are chosen precisely
because of their involvement in that community, some degree of
overlapping representation and interest inevitably results."' 8' "[T]he
Arbitration Act does not fasten on every industry the model of the
disinterested generalist judge."'82
During the course of arbitration, Jacks did make various disclosures,
none of which at the time were objected to by Nationwide. Specifically,
Jacks disclosed that he had served approximately twenty times over a
twenty-three year period as an ACE or CIGNA-appointed arbitrator. Jacks
174. Id. at 643.
175. In 1983, Home sold part of its business, including the reinsurance contract at issue,
to CIGNA (later ACE).
176. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
177. Id. at 147.
178. Id. at 150.
179. Id. at 151.
180. Nationwide 1I, 429 F.3d at 645.
181. Id. at 646 (quoting Int'l. Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (2nd
Cir. 1981).
182. Id. (quoting Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 620
(7th Cir. 2002).
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subsequently, at the behest of Nationwide, made additional disclosures
involving other arbitrations between insurers and re-insurers. Jacks did not
disclose the amount of compensation he received from his participation in
matters involving Home and ACE/CIGNA. These facts, concluded the Sixth
Circuit, do not lead a reasonable person to believe that Jacks was partial to
one side of the arbitration. This is not a case of nondisclosure, but rather
one of ample disclosure. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
denying Nationwide's application for vacatur based on evident partiality of
the arbitrator.183
During the Survey period, the subject of disclosure also received
attention from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which decided Positive
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp.184 In Positive
Software, the parties were involved in a business arrangement that required
Positive Software to develop market and manufacture computer-software
products for the mortgage industry. A dispute arose over the software
products, and Positive Software subsequently filed a lawsuit, alleging
copyright infringement, theft of trade secrets, breach of contract, and other
causes of action. In the lawsuit, Positive Software sought specific
performance, money damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief. The district court granted Positive Software's preliminary injunction
and ordered the parties into arbitration, pursuant to their Software
Subscription Agreement. 185 Arbitration proceeded under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association, with the parties ranking and selecting
their arbitrators. The parties jointly selected Shum, who was requested by
AAA under its normal procedures to disclose any circumstances likely to
affect impartiality or create an appearance of partiality. Shurn did not make
any disclosures. After a seven-day hearing, Shum awarded against Positive
Software on all claims. Afterwards, Positive Software conducted an
investigation into Shurn's background, discovering that Shum had a
professional relationship with new Century's arbitration counsel. Positive
Software then filed a motion to vacate the award, based on the arbitrator's
failure to disclose. 186 The district court granted the motion, and ordered the
parties back into arbitration, with the caveat that they refrain from referring
to the first arbitrator's ruling. 187 New Century appealed, and a panel of the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's vacatur on the ground that the
183. Id. at 649.
184.436 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2006); en banc review granted and reversed, 476 F.3d 278
(5th Cir. 2007).
185. Id. at 496.
186. Id. at 497.
187. Id.
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prior relationship "might have conveyed an impression of possible partiality
to a reasonable person."
' 188
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that vacatur of an arbitration award was improper under the
"evident partiality" theory.189 Specifically, an arbitrator's failure to disclose
that he and the attorney for one of the parties had been two of thirty-four
attorneys who previously represented a non-party corporation in unrelated
litigation (that concluded seven years earlier), did not rise of the appropriate
standard of partiality. "Nondisclosure alone does not require vacatur of an
arbitral award for evident partiality. An arbitrator's failure to disclose must
involve a significant compromising connection to the parties."'1 90
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Nationwide III and the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Positive Software make abundantly clear that practitioners have
a high threshold to meet when attempting to vacate an award on the ground
of evident partiality. In both cases, the relationship was simply too
attenuated to be of any consequence.
V. DOMESTIC RELATIONS ARBITRATION
In Miller v. Miller,191 the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court
of Appeals decision that held that the Domestic Relations Arbitration Act
requires the formality of a hearing in arbitration proceedings. Miller
involved several unsuccessful efforts to resolve contentious issues in a
divorce matter. The trial court entered a stipulated order for binding
arbitration. The arbitrator convened the parties, and attempted to resolve the
case by shuttle diplomacy, a form of mediation to which the parties had
agreed. The arbitrator later produced an "arbitral award," disposing of the
outstanding issues. Plaintiff wife filed suit, asserting that the arbitrator
violated MCL section 600.5070 which mandates a hearing. The trial court
affirmed the award, but a divided panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that DRAA requires a formal hearing.192
188. 436 F.3d at 504 (5th Cir. 2006) (relying on Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 474 Mich. 27, 707 N.W.2d 341 (2005).
192. The only issue the court of appeals decided was whether a domestic relations
litigant is bound by an "arbitral award" if the arbitrator does not conduct a hearing, but
instead meets with the parties ex parte to settle the case. The court did not decide a second
spin-off issue, and that is the question of whether a stipulated order satisfies the requirement
under the DRAA that parties who agree to binding arbitration should do so "by a signed
agreement that specifically provides for an award" regarding delineated issues. MICH. COMP.
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The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision
on statutory grounds. The Court initially examined MCL section 600.5081,
which is the statutory provision that governs vacatur and modification of
arbitration awards under the Domestic Relations Arbitration Act. The
statute permits vacatur if there was evident partiality by an arbitrator
appointed as a neutral, corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct
prejudicing a party's rights. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
arbitrator violated the prejudicial prong of the statute by reason of the
informality of the hearing.'93
The Michigan Supreme Court closely examined the Domestic Relations
Arbitration Act and concluded that it does not define the term "hear" or
"hearing." It also does not set any procedural requirements for arbitration.
"This purposeful requirement of little or no record shows that the
Legislature intended not to require specific procedures in arbitration
proceedings."' 94 "It is inappropriate for a court to read into a statute
something that was intended."' 95 Given the lack of statutory guidance, and
the general informal nature of arbitration, the Michigan Supreme Court
concluded that the Court of Appeals should not have restricted the parties'
freedom to decide how the arbitration hearing should be conducted.
VI. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
A. RUAA Developments
The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), approved by the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955, was passed by the
Michigan State Legislature in 1961.196 The UAA, like the FAA, was passed
to ensure the enforceability ofpre-dispute arbitration agreements under state
law. With the expansion of arbitration, and an increase in court-annexed
arbitration proceedings, commentators have expressed the need for an
updated statute that would codify nearly five decades of case law. In 2000,
the Commissioners enacted the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act {RUAA},
which is a far more detailed and comprehensive statute than the UAA. At
the present time, the RUAA has been adopted in 12 states.' 97
LAWS. ANN. § 600.5071 (West 2000).
193. Miller, 474 Mich. at 30, 707 N.W.2d at 344.
194. The Supreme Court did admit that without a record, reviewing courts cannot
necessarily assess what procedures have been followed. Id.
195. Id. at 31, 707 N.W.2d at 344 (relying on AFSCME v. Detroit, 468 Mich. 388, 662
N.W.2d 695 (2003)).
196. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5011 (West 2000).
197. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.010 (West 2004)); COLO. REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-
[Vol. 53:73
HeinOnline -- 53 Wayne L. Rev. 106 2007
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Organizations which have endorsed the RUAA include the American
Arbitration Association, JAMS/ENDISPUTE, National Arbitration Forum,
Association for Conflict Resolution [the former SPIDR], the National
Academy of Arbitrators, and the ABA House of Delegates.
The RUAA improves upon the UAA in several material respects:
ARBITRABILITY: Under the RUAA, if the agreement does not
specify, matters of substantive arbitrability are for a court to decide,
whereas matters ofprocedural arbitrability are for the arbitrators to
decide. The statute offers some clarification on what is or is not
procedural in nature. Moreover, the RUAA adopts the separability
doctrine, which provides that if an allegation is made with respect
to the validity of the contract as a whole, this issue is for an
arbitrator to determine, not the courts.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES: A question often arises during the
pendency of a case whether the arbitrator has the authority to
impose provisional remedies. Section 8 authorizes the arbitrator to
decide temporary relief if the request is made after the arbitrator's
appointment.
CONSOLIDATION: Section 10 of the RUAA gives court discretion to
order consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings in the
absence of an agreement to consolidate if the claims arose from the
same transaction.
DISCLOSURE: Section 12 of the RUAA imposes on the arbitrator the
requirement to disclose to the parties and other arbitrators [in case
of a tri-partite arrangement] any known facts that a reasonable
person would consider, including existing or past relationships with
parties, counsel, witnesses or other arbitrators.'98
IMMUNITY: Section 14 ensures that arbitrators and arbitration
organizations are immune from civil liability to the same extent as
a judge, even if the arbitrator fails to make disclosures required by
Section 12 of the RUAA.1 99
DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS AND PRE-HEARING CONFERENCE: Arbitrators
have been reluctant to grant relief without a full evidentiary hearing
22-201 (West 2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658A-1 (West 2006); NEV..REv..STAT. 38.206
(West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-1 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 44-7A-l(West
1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.569.1 (West 2004); N.D Cent. Code 32-29.3-01 (2003); 12 OKL.
ST.ANN. § 1851 (2006); OR. REv. STAT. § 36.600 (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-31A-
101 (West 2003); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 7.04A.010 (West 2006).
198. Uniform Arbitration Act § 12(a)-(b) (2000). [hereinafter "UAA"].
199. UAA § 14.
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because one ground for vacating an arbitrator's award is the
arbitrator's refusal to consider all the evidence material to a
controversy. The RUAA makes clear that, with respect to
conducting the arbitration, arbitrators have essentially the same
powers as judges in terms of deciding dispositive motions,
including motions for summary judgment.2"'
DISCOVERY AND SUBPOENAS: One of the advantages of arbitration
is the cost savings achieved by virtue of a more streamlined
process.2" 1 However, to achieve cost savings, discovery in
arbitration has been limited.20 2 This creates a tension between the
need to acquire information for a fair hearing versus the need to
have a cost-effective process.203 The RUAA provides the arbitrators
with discretion to engage in discovery that takes into account the
needs of the parties.20 4 For example, the arbitrator may:
-Issue protective orders;20 5 and,
-Issue subpoenas for enforcement by a court in another
jurisdiction that has adopted the Act.20 6
NON-WAIVEABILITY: The RUAA provides that some rights may not
be contracted away, as these rights are seen as critical to the
functioning of arbitration.20 7 For example, before a dispute arises,
parties may not adjust the arbitrator's power to grant provisional
remedies or the court's jurisdiction to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate, and the right to be represented by counsel.2 8 In other
respects, parties may never waive fundamental rights.20 9 These
rights include:
200. See UAA § 15(a)-(b).
201. See, e.g., Symposium, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 89, 90 (2001).
202. See, e.g., Jason F. Darnall and Richard Bales, ArbitralDiscovery of Non-Parties,
2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 321, 355 (2001) (arguing that cost savings are gained by limiting
discovery in arbitration).
203. See, e.g., Natl. Conf. of Commrs. on Unif. St. Laws, Unif. Arb. Act, § 17(c)
(August 2000) (stating that an arbitrator may order discovery, but should do so only when
"appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the parties to the
arbitration proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of making the
proceeding fair, expeditious, and cost effective").
204. UAA § 17(c).
205. UAA § 17(e).
206. UAA § 17(g).
207. See UAA § 4(b)-(c).
208. UAA § 4(b).
209. See RUAA § 4(b)-(c).
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-the right to confirm, modify, or vacate an award; 211 and,
-the arbitrator's immunity.1
B. The Fair Arbitration Act of 2007
On April 17, 2007, a bill was introduced in the United States Senate
that if passed would amend chapter 1 of Title 9 of the United States Code.212
The overarching aim of the bill's sponsors is to establish fair procedures for
arbitration clauses in contracts.213 In short, a contract containing an
arbitration clause must be bolded and capitalized, and explicitly state
whether participation in the arbitration program is mandatory or
permissive.214 The bill requires notice to all parties that they retain the right
to initiate suit in small claims court {assuming such a court has jurisdiction
over the claim} .21 5 The bill also lists a series of procedures relative to the
competence and neutrality of arbitrators, and protects each party's right to
vote in the selection of the arbitrator.21 6 Interestingly, the bill requires that
the arbitrator be a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court
of the state in which the hearing is being conducted, unless the parties
forego this requirement.21 7
Other protections include the right to be represented or not represented
by counsel, the right to present testimony at a live hearing or to conduct the
proceedings electronically, the right to be governed by the same substantive
law that would apply if the case were filed in court, the right to a written
decision within 30 days of the hearing's closure, and the right to receive a
written explanation of the factual and legal basis of the decision.218 Finally,
under the framework of the bill, the arbitrator may assess fees and costs "in
the interests of the justice" and the administrative agency may waive, defer,
or reduce any fee or charge from the claimant in the event of extreme
hardship.219
As of this writing, the bill resides in the Committee on the Judiciary.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. S. 1135, llOth Cong. (1997).
213. Id.
214. Id. at § 17(a)(1)-(2).
215. Id. at § 17(a)(4).
216. Id. at § 17(b)(2)(A)-(B).
217. Id. at § 17(b)(2)(B)(i).
218. See S. 1135, 110th Cong. § 17(b).
219. Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The last two years of decisions continue to reflect considered, careful,
and cogent thinking on the part of federal and Michigan state courts in the
area of arbitral jurisprudence. First, the United States Supreme Court left
undisturbed the separability doctrine initially enunciated in Prima Paint.220
In doing so, the Supreme Court preserved the arbitrator--court division of
decision-making responsibilities, reserving to the court only those
challenges which go directly to the totality of the contract, inclusive of the
arbitration clause.22' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals continued to be
relatively circumspect in so far as challenges to arbitral awards, protecting
the narrow standard of review, whether the basis of review was manifest
disregard of the law222 or evident partiality.223 Both the Michigan Supreme
Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals continued to embrace common
law arbitration despite the fact that a good argument can be made that such
agreements are arcane and no longer serve the public good.224
To be sure, some decisions ran afoul of expectations, serving to confuse
the jurisprudence. First, in Stutler, the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the
Green Tree analysis to justify its support of arbitration. 22 While its embrace
of arbitration is laudable, the appellate court's decision to decline to assess
*whether the cost of arbitration would be prohibitive to the client as a matter
of federal law plays directly into the hands of the critics of arbitration who
see arbitration, at least in the mandatory context, as a threat to important
civil rights. 226 The decision in Stutler leaves practitioners in a tenuous state,
certainly in situations where state law claims are asserted.227 Second, in
Gobain Ceramics, the Sixth Circuit confused the procedural versus
substantive arbitrability dichotomy by ruling that a time-limitation bar
constituted a substantive limitation on arbitration.228 All circuits but the
Sixth addressing this question have taken the view, first articulated in Wiley
& Sons,229 and endorsed by Howsam,23 ° that the application of time-bar
provisions generally constitutes a question of procedural arbitrability for the
220. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. 440.
221. Id.
222. Donelson, 473 F.3d 684.
223. Nationwide 111, 330 F.3d 843.
224. Wold Architects, 474 Mich. 223, 713 N.W.2d 750.
225. Stuter, 448 F.3d 343.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Gobain Ceramics, 467 F.3d 540.
229. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S.at 556-57.
230. Howsam, 537 U.S. 79.
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arbitrator.23I
Despite these two problematic decisions, the remaining decisions
provide practitioners with a useful guidepost to effectively represent clients
in arbitration.
231. See the following cases cited in Gobain Ceramics: Local 285, Serv. Emp. Int'l
Union, AFL-CIO v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 739-40 (1st Cir. 1995);
Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Commc'n Workers, 340 F.2d 237, 238-39 (2nd Cir. 1965);
Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 765 v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 625 F.2d
1092, 1093-94 (3rd Cir. 1980); Local 1422, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. S.C. Stevedores
Ass'n, 170 F.3d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 1999); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d
750,753-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Beer Sales Drivers, Local 744 v. Metro. Distribs., 763 F.2d 300,
303 (7th Cir. 1985); Auto., Petroleum & Allied Indus. Emp. Union, Local No. 618 v. Town
& Country Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d 509, 511-14 (8th Cir. 1983); Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto.
Salesmen's Union, Local 1095, 834 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1987); Denhardt v. Trailways,
Inc., 767 F.2d 687,689-90 (10th Cir. 1985); Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers Int'l Union
v. AAA Plumbing Pottery Corp., 991 F.2d 1545, 1548 n. 1, 1550 (11th Cir. 1993);
Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Serv. Emp. Int'l Union, Local 722, 746 F.2d 1503, 1506-08
(D.C.Cir. 1984).
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